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THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
THE INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION OF 1867~1868 
KERRY R. OMAN 
In 1867, in an effort to avoid the high costs of 
war and protect overland transportation 
routes, Congress passed a bill authorizing a 
commission to establish peace with the Plains 
Indians. In less than two years, what proved to 
be the last major commission sent out by the 
government to treat with the Indians met and 
signed treaties with the Kiowa, Comanche, 
Kiowa-Apache, Northern and Southern Chey-
enne and Arapaho, Crow, Navajo, Eastern 
Shoshone and Bannock, and the Brule, Oglala, 
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Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, 
Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arc, and Santee 
bands of Lakota Sioux. Their efforts helped 
end Red Cloud's War upon the Northern 
Plains, and, as a result of their reports and 
recommendations, they greatly influenced fed-
eral Indian policy. Yet, despite these accom-
plishments, Congress failed to quickly fulfill 
the treaty stipulations, and instead of initiat-
ing an era of peace, the commission com-
menced a decade of war and bloodshed 
throughout the Plains.! 
The origins of the Peace Commission can 
be traced to the early morning hours of 29 
November 1864, when the Third Regiment of 
Colorado Volunteers, led by the reckless Col. 
John M. Chivington, massacred a friendly band 
of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians along the 
banks of Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. As 
military and newspaper accounts spread con-
cerning the nature of the attack and the hor-
rific mutilation of the bodies that followed, 
several governmental agencies launched inves-
tigations into the incident. 2 One such investi-
gation, created by Congress in March 1865, 
called for a special joint committee, headed 
by Sen. James R. Doolittle, to inquire into the 
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condition of the Indian tribes and the actions 
of the civil and military authorities of the 
United States. 
The "Doolittle Report," as it came to be 
called, took nearly two years to complete and 
contained a mass of documents over 500 pages 
in length. Among its findings, the committee 
described in detail the deterioration of the 
Indians' condition and the causes of Indian 
hostility, which they believed could largely be 
traced to the "aggressions of lawless white 
men." The report also condemned the actions 
of Chivington at Sand Creek and called for 
the creation of five boards of inspection of 
Indian affairs that could annually visit the 
Indian tribes within their districts in an effort 
to better comprehend their conditions and 
avoid future military conflicts.3 
In July 1867, while Congress brewed over 
Doolittle's findings, they received a report from 
another special investigating committee re-
garding the annihilation of Lt. William J. 
Fetterman's command near Fort Phil Kearney 
on 21 December 1866 and Gen. Winfield S. 
Hancock's destruction of a Cheyenne and 
Lakota Sioux village in April 1867.4 Fort Phil 
Kearney was one of three forts located along 
the Bozeman Trail, a route that intersected 
the Powder River Basin as it took miners to 
the goldfields of Montana. Both the fort and 
trail existed on Indian lands set aside by treaty 
and were in the heart of the last remaining 
hunting grounds in the Northern Plains. Along 
with documenting Fetterman's loss and criti-
cizing General Hancock's actions, the report 
called for the creation of two reservations 
where the Indians could be induced to take up 
pastoral and agricultural pursuits. Just how this 
was to be accomplished was the problem. 
Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, a grizzled 
Civil War veteran and a relentless advocate of 
total warfare, had his own ideas of how to deal 
with the Indians. In a letter to the secretary of 
war on 17 June 1867, and included in the pre-
vious report, General Sherman made it clear 
that "if fifty Indians are allowed to remain 
between the Arkansas and Platte we will have 
to guard every stage station, every train, and 
FIG. 1. General William T. Sherman, ca. 1860-
1865. Photogapher, Mathew Brady Studio. War 
Department, US Army, Office of the Chief Signal 
Officer. National Archives at College Park, MD. 
Photograph no. NWDNS-ll1-B-1789. 
all railroad working parties. In other words, 
fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three thou-
sand soldiers." Making sure the secretary of 
war understood him, he proclaimed that "it 
makes little difference whether they be coaxed 
out by Indian commissioners or killed," but 
the government needed to get the Indians out 
as soon as possible.s 
As a result of the Sand Creek Massacre, 
along with the impact of the Doolittle Report, 
the investigation into the actions of Lieuten-
ant Fetterman and General Hancock, and 
other conflicts on the Plains, a bill proposing 
a commission "to establish peace with certain 
hostile Indian tribes" came before Congress 
on 15 July 1867.6 The bill called for a new 
reservation scheme with the ultimate aim be-
ing the "concentration" of all Plains Indians 
onto two reservations-one lying north of the 
state of Nebraska, west of the Missouri River, 
and east of the routes to Montana, and an-
other one located in a district south of the 
state of Kansas and west of the state of Arkan-
sas. 7 The removal of the Plains tribes onto 
reservations was not just an effort to establish 
peace, but more importantly was an attempt 
to secure the safety of overland transportation 
routes. Within the Senate, the bill went 
through a long series of debates over a four-
day period that often looked past the specifics 
of the proposed Peace Commission and cen-
tered on what several senators referred to as 
the "Indian question."8 
In 1867 Congress faced a critical point in 
the history of the country. The question raised 
within the Senate was whether the govern-
ment should attempt to assimilate, concen-
trate, or exterminate the Indians. This was an 
old argument, and a highly contentious one at 
that, but this time it became centered on the 
high price of fighting "hostile" Indians. Ac-
cording to some members of Congress, it cost 
the government nearly $1 million for every 
Indian killed during the present campaign, and 
from $1 to $2 million a week just to defend the 
frontier populations. Many feared that unless 
they acted quickly the current operations 
would burden the treasury for nearly $100 
million before the end of the year, causing the 
typically soft-spoken Sen. John B. Henderson 
of Missouri to stand in front of Congress and 
forcefully demand that "if we can make peace 
with the Indians we had better do it."9 
Reaching consensus that it was better to 
make peace than war, the discussion moved to 
the old and highly controversial question of 
assimilation. Some took the stance that as-
similation was the only solution, while others 
insisted that history had demonstrated the 
impossibility of the two races living in har-
mony with one another. Sen. Samuel C. 
Pomeroy of Kansas summed up many of the 
senators' sentiments: 
I believe, however, religiously, that the only 
ultimate solution of this whole question is, 
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that the Indian shall take his place among 
other men and accept the march of civiliza-
tion, as he must ultimately, or there is noth-
ing except his destiny that awaits him, 
which is extinction. lo 
The overriding attitude centered on their in-
sistence that the Indians not be permitted to 
stand in the way of "civilization" and 
"progress," or, as Senator Henderson pro-
claimed, if nothing but extermination would 
do, then the Indian's "termination must 
come."ll Congress's prevailing drive to pro-
tect the efforts of the railroad, as well as other 
overland routes, enhanced their determina-
tion to remove or exterminate the Indians. 
The bill, which passed both houses of Con-
gress on 20 July 1867, called for a top-ranking 
seven-man commission with the aim of estab-
lishing peace with the Plains Indians. It would 
consist of four civilians and three generals, all 
having a sincere interest and competence in 
dealing with Indian affairs. The goal was to 
establish permanent peace between the Indi-
ans and whites, and thus the bill gave the com-
missioners power to call together the chiefs of 
those Indian tribes then considered to be wag-
ing war against the people of the United States. 
The commissioners were instructed to make 
treaty stipulations that could secure the over-
land lines of transportations, and most spe-
cifically the property of the railroad. It also 
required the commissioners to select a district 
or districts that, after being approved by Con-
gress, would be sufficient to receive all the 
Indian tribes not peacefully residing on per-
manent reservations and living east of the 
R(Jcky Mountains. Congress believed the com-
mission could accomplish peace in this terri-
tory by persuading the Indians to abandon their 
nomadic lifestyles in exchange for reservation 
life in which they could support themselves by 
agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Finally, if 
the commissioners should fail to achieve peace 
and remove the Indians onto reservations, then 
the act authorized the secretary of war to ac-
cept as many as 4,000 civilian volunteers to 
accomplish the task through force. 12 
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The first man named on the commission 
was Nathaniel G. Taylor, then acting com-
missioner of Indian Affairs. Taylor was a 
graduate of Princeton; he had served in the 
House of Representatives before and after the 
Civil War, and he expressed deep religious 
beliefs about "civilizing" the Indians. The sec-
ond civilian was the scholarly Sen. John B. 
Henderson of Missouri who, as acting chair-
man of the Committee of Indian Affairs of 
the Senate, had sponsored the bill that cre-
ated the Peace Commission. Samuel F. 
Tappan, a Christian crusader and former chair-
man of the commission created to investigate 
Chivington's actions at Sand Creek, as well as 
a noted supporter of Indian rights, and John 
B. Sanborn comprised the third and fourth 
civilian members. Sanborn, a retired army of-
ficer, had served on the commission investi-
gating Fetterman's destruction, but at the time 
practiced law in Washington. 13 
In contrast, the remaining three positions 
appointed by the president consisted of expe-
rienced army officers and well-known advo-
cates of military action. Unquestionably, the 
most powerful military leader was Lt. Gen. 
William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman was an 
intense and influential commander of the Di-
vision of the Missouri, whose terrifyingly suc-
cessful tactics during the Civil War and 
outspoken support of military use demanded 
respect and attention from the other mem-
bers. Accompanying him was the fair-minded 
ex-lawyer Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry. Stand-
ing over six feet in height, Terry was an im-
posing figure whose clearness of perception, 
cooperative nature, and Civil War experience 
had earned him respect throughout the mili-
tary.14 The third military officer called was 
retired Gen. William S. Harney, an experi-
enced, well-respected commander who had 
made many friends and enemies among the 
Indians and currently had his home in St. 
Louis. 1s 
The commission first met in St. Louis on 6 
August 1867. They selected the pro-Indian 
civilian Nathaniel G. Taylor as president and 
immediately began discussing how they would 
gather the chiefs and leading warriors of the 
tribes. Taking advantage of the civil and mili-
tary power possessed by those on the commis-
sion, General Sherman sent out orders to the 
commanders of the various military posts, 
while Commissioner Taylor instructed the 
superintendents and agents under his charge 
to gather the Indians together: those in the 
northern section were to meet at Fort Laramie 
on 13 September, and those in the south were 
to meet near Fort Larned, Kansas, around 13 
October. As they waited, the commissioners 
resolved to charter a steamer and examine the 
country along the upper Missouri for a suit-
able reservation. During this time, the commis-
sioners also met with military, governmental, 
and civilian authorities at Fort Leavenworth, 
inquiring into the present condition of the 
Indians and discussing the overall purpose of 
the commission. 16 
Low water hampered their progress up the 
Missouri River; consequently, just above the 
mouth of the Cheyenne River they decided to 
return in order to reach Fort Laramie by the 
desired time. On the return trip the commis-
sioners held short councils with many of the 
bands then living along the Missouri. It was 
the experienced opinion of the Peace Com-
mission after meeting with and viewing the 
condition of these tribes that many of the treaty 
stipulations then in force were altogether in-
appropriate. They felt the treaties had been 
"made in total ignorance of [the tribes'] num-
bers and disposition, and in utter disregard of 
their wants." It was also the commissioners' 
opinion that several of the agents needed to 
be removed and replaced by honest, fair-deal-
ing men who would be able to secure respect 
and confidence from the Indians. Inappropri-
ate treaty stipulations, broken promises by the 
government, and dishonest agents were just 
some of the concerns raised in the earlier re-
ports on the conditions of the Indian tribes-
all problems that Congress had discussed and 
hoped that the current Peace Commission 
could remedy.17 
Arriving in Omaha on 11 September 1867, 
the commissioners immediately proceeded up 
the Platte River on the Union Pacific rail-
road. In the vicinity of North Platte, Nebraska, 
they met a considerable number of Lakota 
Sioux and Northern Cheyenne. Unfortu-
nately, most of these people were with Spot-
ted Tail, a chief of the Brule Sioux noted for 
his friendship toward whites. Even more dis-
couraging was information that there was little 
hope in persuading Red Cloud, one of the most 
courageous and formidable Indian leaders on 
the Northern Plains, and his followers to at-
tend the council. With unbridled skill as a 
warrior, orator, and diplomatic negotiator, Red 
Cloud had emerged as the leader in the oppo-
sition to white encroachment on Lakota Sioux 
lands, particularly against the three forts built 
along the Bozeman Trail. These northern 
bands made it clear that peace could not be 
achieved until the United States abandoned 
the Bozeman Trail forts and the soldiers had 
left. Lasting only two days, the conferences at 
North Platte accomplished little. The only 
concession was the commissioners agreed to 
supply those present with ammunition to aid 
them on their fall hunt. Nevertheless, the com-
missioners persuaded them to return after their 
hunt, sometime around the first of November, 
hoping that would provide adequate time to 
convince a delegation of the northern tribes 
to come in. ls 
As the Peace Commission made its way 
toward Fort Larned, the president summoned 
General Sherman to Washington, and in his 
place appointed the long-whiskered and highly 
competent Gen. Christopher C. Augur. Al-
though Sherman would come and go through-
out the life of the commission, Augur became 
a full, acting member until the end. The 
commission's path first took them to Fort 
Harker, a small military post along the Smoky 
Hill River in central Kansas. Here, nine news-
paper reporters, a large military escort, and 
thirty wagons containing goods for the up-
coming council joined the commissioners. On 
12 October, they arrived at Fort Larned, from 
which they passed southward across the Ar-
kansas River and made their way toward Medi-
cine Lodge Creek, some seventy-five miles 
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FIG. 2. Chief Red Cloud, Oglala Sioux, c. 1870-
1880. Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, 
Colorado Historical Society, and Denver Art 
Museum, Denver, CO. Photograph No. X-31824. 
distant. Known to the Indians as Timbered 
Hill River, the site was a favorite Sun Dance 
location for the Kiowa and a medicine lodge 
still stood there from their 1866 ceremony-
thus the whites' name for the stream. 19 This 
location had been chosen because the Chey-
enne, still angered from General Hancock's 
destruction of one of their villages earlier that 
y~ar, refused to meet any closer to the forts 
along the Arkansas River. 20 
When the Peace Commission neared the 
great encampment of the Southern Plains In-
dians, their numbers had increased to the for-
midable size of nearly 600 men and more than 
1,200 animals. Yet, as they approached Medi-
cine Lodge Creek, they could not help but be 
impressed with what lay in front of them-
thousands of ponies and hundreds of lodges 
belonging to the more than 5,000 Indians 
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scattered throughout the valley.21 The coun-
cils began on 19 October with the Comanche, 
Kiowa, Arapaho, and Kiowa-Apache, while 
most of the Cheyenne remained camped some 
forty miles distant along the Cimarron River.22 
Senator Henderson opened the formal pro-
ceedings by pledging the commission's "sacred 
honor" in correcting the wrongs performed by 
the government and stating their intention of 
making a lasting peace between the two 
peoples. As the commissioners sat amidst the 
grand council tent that had been erected for 
this occasion, Senator Henderson proposed 
the Great Father's wish to remove the Kiowa, 
Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache to a reserva-
tion on the Red River and around the Wichita 
Mountains. He explained that the United 
States would provide them homes, school-
houses, churches, teachers, agricultural imple-
ments, cattle, sheep, hogs, and other tools 
needed to make the shift to "civilization." 
Satanta, the great Kiowa leader, then rose to 
speak. Complaining about the actions of white 
soldiers, he professed his "love to roam over 
the wide prairie" and his disgust with the 
thought of living upon a reservation. Henry 
M. Stanley, one of the news correspondents, 
recorded that Satanta's bluntness "produced a 
rather blank look upon the faces of the peace 
commissioners." In similar fashion, and over 
the course of the next two days, the commis-
sioners listened as several chiefs and headmen 
rose and expressed their wishes for peace while 
also maintaining a desire to remain on the 
lands of their fathers. 23 
Despite the negative reactions to the pros-
pect of reservation life, and more likely in 
response to the large quantity of gifts brought 
to the council, the Peace Commissioners con-
cluded two separate treaties with the Kiowa, 
Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache bands on 21 
October. The treaties placed the bands on res-
ervations in present-day Oklahoma where they 
would receive a token amount of annual goods. 
But more significantly, the treaties would force 
some of the most powerful warrior-hunter so-
cieties into a foreign world of sedentary farm-
ing. As a reward for signing, the commissioners 
gave them tens of thousands of dollars' worth 
of goods. 24 During this time, Black Kettle, a 
highly respected advocate of peace and one of 
the few survivors of the Sand Creek Massacre, 
along with some other Cheyenne approached 
the commissioners and asked them to remain 
for a few more days until those camped along 
the Cimarron River would come in. Recogniz-
ing the importance in establishing peace with 
the Cheyenne, and yet to the disgust of some 
members of the Peace Commission, they 
agreed to wait. 25 
As the requested days came and went the 
commissioners grew leery of the long delay. 
Mounted with this agitation was the growing 
concern among some members of the commis-
sion, along with the Kiowa and Comanche, 
that violence would erupt when and if the 
Cheyenne eventually decided to come. 
Around noon on 27 October, loud shouts, rifle 
fire, and the thunderous noise of galloping 
ponies signaled the arrival of the Cheyenne 
delegation. Dashing across Medicine Lodge 
Creek within feet of the commissioners, their 
impressive entrance exemplified the pride and 
power that characterized the lives of these 
nomadic warriors. As the chiefs and headmen 
emerged in friendship, fears dissipated and they 
agreed to hold a "Grand Council" the follow-
ing day.26 
As with the earlier treaty council, Senator 
Henderson made the initiatory remarks. In his 
speech he professed peace and the desire to 
create a reservation south of Kansas and be-
tween the Arkansas and Cimarron Rivers 
where the Cheyenne and Arapaho could live 
without being molested by white settlers. Af-
ter conversing with the principal chiefs, the 
commissioners convinced them to sign a treaty 
of peace. The commissioners then distributed 
presents, along with some annuity goods that 
had been detained since the proceeding spring, 
throughout the ranks of the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho tribes, which, as Stanley recorded, 
"caused universal satisfaction to all parties."27 
George Bent, a white trader and interpreter 
married to Black Kettle's niece, was at the 
treaty signing, and recognizing its significance, 
he later wrote that this was "the most impor-
tant treaty ever signed by the Cheyenne," as it 
"marked the beginning of the end" for these 
people as free and independent warriors and 
hunters.28 
The treaties concluded along Medicine 
Lodge Creek in October 1867 assigned the 
Indians to two reservations within the west-
ern part of Indian Territory. This land was to 
be held in common among the tribes, invali-
dating any cession of the lands without the 
agreement of three-fourths of all the adult 
males. In response to the commissioners' in-
sistence that the Indians end their old way of 
life and settle down to cultivate the land, the 
treaties provided for farming implements, 
buildings, mechanics' shops, clothing, and 
other necessary goods that, in the minds of 
the whites, would allow the Indians to move 
closer to "civilized" life. The treaties prom-
ised annuity goods for a period of thirty years, 
with the stipulation that war between the par-
ties should forever cease. From statements 
made during the councils, it appears likely that 
the treaties might not have been signed had 
not the commissioners agreed to give the In-
dians the right to hunt on any lands south of 
the Arkansas as long as the buffalo existed in 
such numbers as to justify the chase. 29 
In hopes of procuring a council with Red 
Cloud and the Lakota Sioux and Northern 
Cheyenne, the commission immediately re-
turned to the North Platte area and then 
moved on to Fort Laramie. Upon arriving at 
the fort the only Indians found waiting were 
Crow. This was frustrating because the Crow 
had a history of being friendly toward whites. 
In the report filed by the commission the fol-
lowing winter, they expressed their regret in 
their "failure" to procure a council with Red 
Cloud and his leading warriors. They lamented 
that had they had the opportunity, they did 
"not for a moment doubt that a just and hon-
orable peace could have been secured."30 Be-
fore leaving Fort Laramie, however, the 
commissioners received word from the defiant 
Lakota leader Red Cloud. He declared that 
their war revolved around white intrusion into 
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their last remaining hunting grounds along the 
Powder River. He also assured the commis-
sion that once the government abandoned the 
military forts in the Powder River country the 
war would cease. Prior to departing, the com-
missioners sent word back to Red Cloud pro-
posing a spring or summer meeting. With this 
the commission dismissed until December, 
when they were to reassemble in Washington 
and draft a report of their proceedings for 
Congress,3! 
During the winter the commissioners re-
viewed their efforts, submitted a report to the 
president, and made future plans to meet with 
the northern bands in the spring. The report, 
submitted to the president on 7 January 1868, 
expressed in a sympathetic yet somewhat pa-
tronizing tone toward the Indians, outlined a 
general history of their actions. Yet, the ma-
jority of the document described what they 
understood to be the causes of the past fight-
ing. The report mentioned the consequences 
of the Chivington Massacre, the role of the 
Powder River forts, the problems caused by 
frontier settlers overrunning Indian lands, the 
results of General Hancock's destruction of 
the Cheyenne and Lakota Sioux village, and 
other wrongs that instigated Indian aggres-
sion. It also pointed out that once the Indians 
signed the treaties, promising government ac-
tion and aid, war with these tribes ceased.32 
In the concluding section of the report, the 
commissioners expressed a strong desire for 
the establishment of two districts of land where 
the Indians could be introduced to agricul-
tural implements that would allow them to 
begin to abandon their nomadic ways and place 
them on a path toward assimilation into the 
white man's world. As the commissioners saw 
it, by following their proposals the Indians 
could become civilized in the short period of 
twenty-five years. Therefore, the commission-
ers made an impassioned call for prompt con-
gressional action in ratifying the provisions of 
the treaties.33 
The tone of this document, along with 
numerous suggestions of doing "good to them 
that hate us," have led one scholar to conclude 
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FIG. 3. General William T. Sherman and commissioners in council with Indian chiefs at Ft. Laramie, Wyoming, 
c. 1867-1868. Photographer, Alexander Gardner, Office of the Chief Signal Officer. National Archives at 
College Park, MD. Photograph no. NWDNS-lll-SC-95986. 
that this must have been written by Commis-
sioner Taylor, who then persuaded the gener-
als to sign it. As a former preacher, Taylor had 
been schooled in biblical thought, and the 
sympathy for the Indian warriors expressed in 
this report speaks contrary to the philosophies 
of military men like General Sherman. Nev-
ertheless, despite advocating a policy of kind-
ness, the report contained the signatures of all 
the commissioners.34 
As the commissioners hoped to engage the 
northern tribes in the spring, they sent out 
various so-called "chief-catchers" who worked 
throughout the late winter and early spring in 
efforts to convince the Lakota Sioux leaders 
to come to Fort Laramie for an April coun-
cil.35 With this in mind, the January report 
also suggested moving the Bozeman Trail route 
to Montana west of the Bighorn Mountains, 
thereby relinquishing the need for the Powder 
River forts and appeasing the Lakota Sioux 
and Northern Cheyenne. As winter contin-
ued, the government soon became convinced 
that something had to be done to end the 
bloodshed along the Powder River. Red Cloud, 
whose physical characteristics matched his 
prowess and unwavering leadership, now com-
manded the respect and attention of the US 
government. Consequently, on 2 March, Gen. 
Ulysses S. Grant wrote to General Sherman, 
"I think it will be well to prepare at once for 
the abandonment of the posts, Phil Kearny, 
Reno and Fetterman and to make all the capi-
tal with the Indians that can be made out of 
the change."36 For the only time in history, 
the US army was giving in to the demands of 
a "hostile" Indian leader. 
In early spring the commissioners once 
again headed toward Fort Laramie. Arriving 
in Omaha, Nebraska, in early April, Sherman 
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FIG. 4. Indian Peace Commission, c. 1868. Courtesy of Denver Public Library, Colorado Historical 
Society, and Denver Art Museum, Denver, CO. Photograph no. X-32463. 
received orders to immediately return to Wash-
ington and testify in President Johnson's im-
peachment trial. Prior to his departure, the 
militarily minded leader strongly admonished 
the commission to proceed with its previous 
intentions of placing the northern tribes on 
one large reservation, while also being cau-
tious about giving arms and ammunition to 
those tribes currently residing off the desig-
nated reservation area. As well, he pointed 
out the importance in settling questions that 
had arisen regarding the Navajo Indians, rec-
ommending that the solution to their prob-
lems would come from removing them to 
Indian Territory near the Red RiverY 
Once again, Fort Laramie proved disap-
pointing. Greeting them was the familiar Brule 
leader Spotted Tail, but Red Cloud and his 
followers were nowhere to be found. There 
was some hope-granted, a small one-that 
they would come in toward the end of the 
month. The commissioners had arrived pre-
pared to submit to all of Red Cloud's unte-
lenting demands, specifically the abandonment 
and closure of the Bozeman Trail and the grant-
ing of hunting rights along the Republican 
River. After waiting only a short time, how-
ever, they decided to hold a preliminary coun-
cil with the Brule on 13 April, outlining treaty 
stipul~tions that defined a reservation designed 
to concentrate the northern tribes on a large 
tract of land encompassing nearly all of 
present-day South Dakota west of the Mis-
souri River. Agencies would be built along the 
Missouri River where the government could 
easily access them by river travel, although 
the Lakota Sioux would later use this as an 
argument against the government, proclaim-
ing that this was simply a tactic to force them 
into moving to an area where they had no 
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desire to live. Along with granting hunting 
rights on the Republican River, the treaty set 
aside the country north of the North Platte 
River and east of the Big Horn Mountains as 
"unceded Indian territory," forbidding white 
people from settling upon it. The remainder 
of the treaty was similar to those signed during 
the Medicine Lodge councils the proceeding 
year, calling for farming implements and other 
tools that would aid them in moving closer to 
the white man's way of life.38 
With no sign of Red Cloud, the commis-
sioners convinced the Brule Sioux to sign the 
treaty on 29 April. After that, they held a 
council with some Crow who arrived at Fort 
Laramie during the first week of May. The 
commissioners had prepared a treaty for them 
to sign granting them country within Mon-
tana Territory and carrying wi th it the charac-
teristic conditions and annuities promised in 
the other treaties. On 7 May the headmen of 
the tribe placed their marks in agreement. 
They also concluded another treaty on 10 May 
with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern 
Arapaho, granting them the choice of living 
on the lands given to their southern relatives 
as a result of the treaty of Medicine Lodge or 
with the Lakota Sioux in the north.39 
Although by the first of May news had 
reached Red Cloud of the army's decision to 
abandon the Bozeman Trail, he reportedly sent 
word to the commissioners telling them "when 
we see the soldiers moving away and the forts 
abandoned, then I will come down and talk."40 
This information spread serious doubts 
throughout the commission whether they 
could get the remaining Lakota Sioux to sign 
the treaty. With this in mind, and not want-
ing to sit around indefinitely, the commission-
ers agreed to divide into four parties: General 
Alfred Terry would proceed to Fort Randall 
and Fort Sully to provide for the Indians "en 
route to the reservation"; General Augur would 
go to Fort Bridger to establish treaties with 
the Snake, Bannock, and other Indians resid-
ing along railroad lines in Utah; General 
Sherman and Samuel Tappan would hold a 
council with the Navajos; and General Harney 
and John Sanborn would stay at Fort Laramie 
and conclude treaties with the Lakota Sioux 
Indians and then proceed up the Missouri 
River, join General Terry, and convince the 
Indians near Fort Sully and Fort Rice to place 
their marks on the same Fort Laramie Treaty.41 
At Fort Laramie, Harney and Sanborn were 
the first to meet success. On 25 and 26 May 
some Oglala, Miniconjou, and Yanktonai 
Sioux came and signed the treaty. A short 
time later, the two commissioners carried the 
Fort Laramie Treaty up the Missouri River 
and joined General Terry at Fort Rice. Aided 
this time by Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, known 
throughout Indian country as "Black Robe" 
because of his Jesuit background, a party of 
Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, and Yanktonai, includ-
ing the famous leader Sitting Bull, assembled 
on 2 July. In reality, there would not be any 
discussions about the treaty stipulations. The 
three commissioners planned on having the 
Fort Laramie treaty read, allowing some time 
for the chiefs to speak, and then instructing 
them to place their marks on the prepared 
document. These proceedings, as historian 
Robert Utley has pointed out, "dramatized the 
fantasy world in which Indian treaties were 
concocted."42 These tribes had little interest 
in or understanding of what had taken place 
at the Fort Laramie councils. They wanted the 
whites out of their country and would fight as 
long as necessary. An important opponent of 
the treaty was Chief Gall, one of the most 
bold and aggressive leaders in the Sioux 
Nation's fight against unwanted white aggres-
sion. His impressive physical strength, com-
bined with his bravery and determination, 
made him a formidable leader of his people. 
Nevertheless, the council went as planned, 
and despite the prophetic statements by Gall 
that "if we make peace, you will not hold it," 
the chiefs placed their marks on the treaty.43 
Meanwhile, in late May, General Sherman, 
who had returned from Washington at the time 
the commission agreed to disperse, and Samuel 
Tappan met with the Navajo at the Bosque 
Redondo in eastern New Mexico. In 1864 the 
government forcibly removed the Navajo to 
this remote and desolate location in an effort 
to make them agriculturalists and prevent fur-
ther raiding into the New Mexico settlements. 
In one of the most tragic episodes of Indian 
exile in US history, Colonel Kit Carson 
rounded up 8,000 Navajos and forced them to 
walk more than 350 miles from northeastern 
Arizona and northwestern New Mexico to 
Bosque Redondo, a desolate tract on the Pecos 
River in eastern New Mexico. More than 3,000 
people died either by starvation, freezing to 
death, succumbed to sickness or were shot by 
soldiers during the tragic years of what the 
Navajo called "The Long Walk." Bosque 
Redondo was supposed to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the reservation system, yet it 
was a dismal failure and the Navajo wanted 
desperately to return to their homeland. 
Sherman initiated talks on 28 May at Fort 
Sumner. He began by informing them he had 
come for the purpose of learning about their 
condition and what could be done for them. 
Barboncito, designated by Sherman as the head 
chief of the Navajo, then talked at length. He 
related the extent and depth of their suffer-
ings during the past four years. Numerous 
peopled had died, many were currently ill, and 
despite their efforts to cultivate the land the 
soil simply failed to yield-all graphically dis-
played by their current state of poverty. After-
ward, Sherman explained that there was land 
within "Indian Territory" south of the Arkan-
sas River where they could send a delegation 
to decide if they wanted this for their reserva-
tion. If their desire was to return home, how-
ever, the government would draw a boundary 
and the Navajo would not be allowed to cross 
that line except to trade. Without hesitation 
Barboncito responded to Sherman, saying that 
"we do not want to go to the right or left but 
straight back to our own country."44 
Consequently, on 1 June 1868 Sherman and 
Tappan presented the Navajo with a treaty 
which, in the words of one scholar, "gave the 
Navajo a new beginning."45 It allowed them to 
leave the Bosque Redondo reservation while 
establishing strict boundaries within their old 
homeland. It also called for the creation of an 
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agency consisting of a warehouse, carpenter 
shop, blacksmith shop, schoolhouse, chapel, 
and a home for an agent. It ordered children 
to attend school and learn English "in order to 
insure the civilization of the Indians entering 
into this treaty." And like the Medicine Lodge 
treaties and Fort Laramie Treaty, the Navajo 
would be given the necessary farming imple-
ments to make them self-supporting and "civi-
lized." After listening to the treaty stipulations, 
Barboncito led the other chiefs and headmen 
in placing their marks upon the document, 
following which they immediately began 
preparations for removing to their homeland.46 
While all of this was happening, General 
Augur traveled west to Fort Bridger in present-
day southwestern Wyoming. The Eastern 
Shoshone and Bannock were currently at peace 
with the whites, and as Augur explained when 
he began negotiations, it was the government's 
desire to "arrange matters that there may never 
hereafter be cause of war between them." In 
truth, this meant that Augur intended to place 
the Indians on permanent reservations where 
they would not interfere with the expanding 
railroad lines. On 3 July 1868 they signed a 
treaty that placed the Eastern Shoshone on a 
reservation in the Wind River country and 
stipulated that the Bannock be located some-
where near the mouth of the Portneuf River, 
with detailed boundaries to be designated at a 
later time. True to form, the provisions within 
this treaty were almost identical to the other 
treaties made by the Peace Commission dur-
ing the previous two yearsY 
Along the Bozeman Trail, the abandon-
ment of the Powder River forts proved to be a 
slow, drawn-out process lasting throughout 
much of the summer. As a result of frustrating 
attempts to negotiate the sale of the forts' goods 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the public, 
it was not until 29 July that the troops at Fort 
C. F. Smith marched away for the last time. 
Early the next morning Red Cloud and his 
warriors, who had watched from a distance 
the activities of the preceding day, trium-
phantly rode into the fort and burned it to the 
ground. By the first of August, Fort Phil Kearny 
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had suffered a similar fate and Fort Reno had 
been abandoned, making it appear the time 
had come to make peace. Red Cloud, how-
ever, still failed to come in, and attacks con-
tinued throughout the month of September.48 
The commission reunited in Chicago dur-
ing the early days of October. Overall, aside 
from some bands of Lakota Sioux, the com-
missioners concluded treaties of peace with 
most of the Indian tribes east of the Rocky 
Mountains and west of the Mississippi River, 
and they still hoped Red Cloud would place 
his mark on the treaty before the end of the 
year. 49 Nonetheless, war had once again re-
turned to the Southern Plains, as stipulations 
within the Medicine Lodge treaties were go-
ing unfulfilled. As it was not considered worth-
while for the commissioners to continue efforts 
to bring in Red Cloud, all that was left for 
them was to submit a final report representing 
their considerations of the existing situation 
of Indian affairs. 
President Johnson's impeachment proceed-
ings continued to detain Senator Henderson, 
so the remaining seven members drafted the 
final report. First, they recommended that 
Congress consider the treaties made by the 
commission to be in full force regardless of 
whether they had been ratified. Next, they 
urged Congress to provide provisions for those 
tribes who had been or would be located per-
manently on their respective reservations. One 
of the most important recommendations came 
from General Terry, regarding the future pro-
cess of Indian negotiations. He suggested from 
this point on the government "cease to recog-
nize the Indian tribes as domestic dependent 
nations," and that in the future no more "trea-
ties shall be made with any Indian tribe," forc-
ing the Indians into being personally subject 
to the laws of the United States. With blood-
shed once again encompassing the Southern 
Plains, Congress needed to reconsider whether 
treaty making was the proper method of doing 
business with the Indians. 5o 
Essentially, the commissioners all agreed 
on the first section of the report; however, the 
last portion strongly represented the feelings 
of the military officers and particularly Gen-
eral Sherman. In light of the depredations 
currently being committed by the Southern 
Plains Indians, the commissioners called for 
military force to compel the Indians to go to 
their reservations and further recommended 
that they should no longer be permitted to 
hunt outside their reservation boundaries. 
And, despite strong opposition from Commis-
sioner Taylor, they voted to recommend the 
transfer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the 
War Department. Sherman had long believed 
that by giving the War Department control 
over Indian Affairs the army could act more 
efficiently, giving them greater power to end 
the fighting between the whites and Indians. 
With this completed on 10 October, the Peace 
Commission disbanded, never to meet again, 
ending the last great effort by the US govern-
ment to make treaties with the IndiansY 
After the Peace Commission dissolved, and 
following a successful fall hunt, the Lakota 
Sioux, led by the confident Red Cloud and a 
large delegation of approximately 125 of his 
warriors, came into Fort Laramie for a confer-
ence. The commissioners had left a copy of 
the treaty at the fort, and the post commander, 
Maj. William Dye, had been given authority 
to represent the Peace Commission. The gov-
ernment wished to have Red Cloud's mark 
upon the already prepared treaty, and conse-
quently they were not willing to negotiate. 
Finally, after a two-day council, and with a 
show of reluctance, Red Cloud reportedly 
"washed his hands with the dust of the floor" 
and signed the document. Although Major Dye 
came away apprehensive about the prospect 
of lasting peace, the government had at last 
obtained the long-awaited end to Red Cloud's 
War.52 
Although the Indians had placed their 
marks on the treaties, Congress still had to 
ratify them and appropriate the necessary funds 
to carry out their provisions. One of the prob-
lems of treaty making existed with Congress's 
failure to support treaty commissioners' ac-
tions in the field. The nineteenth century is 
replete with instances when, for one reason or 
another, Congress either rejected treaties or 
their stipulations went unfulfilled. 53 Aware of 
this, the reports and letters of the Peace Com-
mission continually demanded that Congress 
act swiftly in ratifying the treaties and appro-
priating the necessary funds to fulfill them. 
One such example came from Commissioner 
Taylor during the summer of 1868. Writing to 
O. H. Browning, acting secretary of the inte-
rior, Taylor recounted the Lakota Sioux trea-
ties from that year and implored the secretary 
that "if peace is to be preserved," then "speedy 
action in appropriating the funds necessary to 
care for and feed the most destitute is abso-
lutely necessary."54 
"The prime object of the government in 
the pacific policy pursued by its commission-
ers," wrote General William S. Harney on 23 
November 1868, "has been to secure and pre-
serve peaceful relations with our Indian tribes." 
As he saw it, "to secure perpetual peace with 
the Sioux Indians it is only necessary to fulfill 
the terms of the treaty made by the peace com-
missioners."55 Later that year, acting on his 
own accord in an effort to begin fulfilling the 
government's obligations, General Harney 
purchased articles of food, agricultural imple-
ments, building materials, and other articles 
necessary for the establishment of agencies and 
the support of the Lakota Sioux throughout 
the winter. Although Congress later forced 
Harney to account for his actions, General 
Sherman recognized the importance of keep-
ing peace and supported the unauthorized ex-
penditures. Nevertheless, the extended debates 
that accompanied Congress's delay in appro-
priating the necessary funds needed to fulfill 
the treaty stipulations brought discourage-
ment and shame to those men instructed to 
deal with the Indians. Coupled with the 
government's legacy of broken promises, the 
problem of gaining congressional support for 
the 1867 and 1868 treaties caused added prob-
lems among a people who already had reason 
enough to distrust the white man.56 
While Harney tried to fulfill the Fort 
Laramie Treaty, the military decided to pun-
ish the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho for 
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supposed breeches in their treaty agreements. 
In the Southern Plains, annuity goods had been 
slow to arrive, with some even being withheld 
from the Cheyenne as a result of a raid on the 
Kaw. Angered and frustrated with the actions 
of the government, a Cheyenne raiding party 
headed out toward the Pawnee. When they 
returned in August, fifteen white men had been 
killed, and war once again spread across the 
Southern Plains. The following month a party 
of fifty scouts under the ambitious Maj. George 
A. Forsyth fought for their lives on the banks 
of a small island within the Arikara Fork of 
the Republican River in what has come to be 
called the Battle of Beecher's Island. Then on 
27 November 1868, Lt. Col. George A. Custer 
tested the effectiveness of the army's new 
policy of winter campaigns as he attacked and 
destroyed Black Kettle's Cheyenne camp along 
the Washita River. Thus, by the end of the 
year, the Medicine Lodge treaties had done 
little to bring peace to the Southern Plains.57 
Regarding the Lakota Sioux treaties, it ap-
pears that in large measure the Indians did not 
learn the full content of the Fort Laramie 
Treaty until Red Cloud returned from Wash-
ington in 1870; had they understood that the 
government expected them to take up a life of 
farming near the agencies along the Missouri 
River, they might never have consented.58 
Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes the 
Fort Laramie Treaty proved to be the most 
lasting and significant at the time, as it suc-
cessfully ended Red Cloud's War. Despite those 
Indians who refused to settle on the reserva-
tion, the treaty placed Red Cloud in a situa-
tion where, as Robert Utley has pointed out, 
he became "a maddeningly disruptive influ-
ence for the next forty-one years, [butl never 
again took the warpath."59 
Because war existed on the Southern Plains 
when the commission dissolved in October 
1868, their activities have often been viewed 
as a failure. Yet in the end, the Peace Com-
mission left a large legacy. Many of the changes 
within federal Indian policy following 1868 
can be traced in one form or another to the 
ideas or recommendations brought forth by 
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the commissioners. For example, Francis Paul 
Prucha has demonstrated that the reports of 
the peace commissioners "gave new impetus 
to reformers interested in the Indians" and 
spurred new interest in those promoting a 
Christian approach to Indian policy.60 The 
development of President Grant's celebrated 
"Peace Policy" advocating concentration, edu-
cation, and civilization, along with the cre-
ation of a Board ofIndian Commissioners, also 
profited greatly from the two reports made by 
the Peace Commission.61 The end of treaty 
making with the Indians in 1871 can be traced 
to ideas present within the final report of the 
commission. In fact, aside from a treaty made 
with the Nez Perce in late 1868, the Peace 
Commission was the last authorized group sent 
out by the government to conclude treaties 
with the Indian tribes of the United States.62 
As well, the issue of transferring the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs to the War Department, rec-
ommended by the commissioners in their fi-
nal report, became a major issue for more than 
a decade. 63 
The final sentiments of the Peace Commis-
sion supported General Sherman's intent to 
increase military control in the West. Sherman 
firmly believed in using military force to end 
Indian conflicts, a fact largely illustrated by 
the actions of Custer on the Washita River 
not even two months after the commissioners 
issued their report. Although Sherman was 
not opposed to the policies of peace prescribed 
for the Indians, he understood the persuasive 
power of military might. In his annual report 
for 1868 he remarked on this policy as a "double 
process of peace within their reservations and 
war without." He further intended to "pros-
ecute the war with vindictive earnestness 
against all hostile Indians, till they are oblit-
erated or beg for mercy; and therefore all who 
want peace must get out of the theatre of war. "64 
This philosophy of war against those Indians 
residing outside their reservations quickly be-
came the driving force behind Indian policy 
throughout the next decade, and in many ways 
must be viewed as the most lasting and ironic 
result of the Peace Commission. 65 
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